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MALAY REACTION TO THE 1930S ECONOMIC DEPRESSION IN 
MALAYA
The unprecedented World Economic Depression of the 1930s affected 
Malaya just as it did to numerous other countries in the world. In 
Malaya’s case, with the rubber and tin industries, the two main pillars 
of the country’s economy, well integrated with the international 
market forces, the sudden economic downturn caused the collapse 
of both these industries, resulting in widespread retrenchment and 
mass unemployment of workers. To the people of multiracial Malaya 
the economic meltdown was more than an economic crisis. It was 
a crisis of all sorts that threatened their very own survival. Despite 
the colonial government’s efforts to contain the situation every 
community was displaced in one way or another though by varying 
degrees. This paper examines some of the immediate effects of the 
economic depression on the Federated Malay States and confines its 
discussion to Malay reaction to the crisis – how they were affected, 
the challenges they faced and how they coped with the crisis and the 
government’s role in ensuring the protection of the Malays. It also 
discusses Malay reaction to the presence of immigrant races in the 
country and their rise to seek greater protection of their rights as 
natives of the country. 
Keywords: Economic Depression, Malays Reaction, Immigrant Labour, 
Malay Rights.
Introduction
It is common knowledge that the collapse in the price of primary products in 
the Wall Street Stock Exchange in New York in late October 1929 triggered the 
Economic Depression of the 1930s. With the economies of several countries 
well integrated with the international market forces, the sharp fall in the price 
of primary goods in the Wall Street, led to an unprecedented economic crisis, 
with global impact. Though small, Malaya was one of those countries severely 
hit by the economic down turn. With the country depending almost entirely on 
her export industries for her economic and social well-being, the sudden fall 
in the price of goods in the export sector affected her economy with serious 
consequences. Her primary products of tin and rubber were inextricably tied 
to the international market forces and a large portion of it went to the United 
States and England. For example, in 1929, 57.2 percent of all exports from 
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Malaya went to the United States, with the balance to England, Europe and 
countries in Asia, like India and Japan.1 Hence when the prices of her primary 
products collapsed in the world market it had a devastating impact on Malaya’s 
economy and more importantly on the people who were dependent on these 
two industries for their livelihood. 
While it is true that Malaya’s overdependence on her export economy 
was often cited as the main reason for economic crisis in the country, the 
situation was also aggravated by her overdependence on foreign countries for 
her consumer goods as well. Almost all the consumer items  ranging from food 
to machinery were imported from England, Europe and Asian countries as local 
manufacturing industries were in their infancy. Clearly, it was in the economic 
interest of Britain to make her colony buy all its consumer needs from profits 
made from the rubber and tin industries instead of producing them locally. 
Another reason why the crisis had severe impact on Malaya was that there was 
a lack of mechanism from the British colonial government or the European 
entrepreneurs to cushion the impact as many did not foresee its severity and 
the damage that would follow. Many thought it would be another cyclical 
downturn that would pass over soon. They, therefore adopted a wait and see 
policy. But they were proven wrong. The economic slump of the 1930s was to 
be the worst in the history of the country and indeed for the rest of the world. 
In Malaya, with the price of rubber and tin tumbling down rapidly, it became 
clear that it was economically not viable to continue producing these two main 
items of export as before. Restrictions on the production of tin and rubber 
were enforced to scale down production. Labour became redundant in these 
two industries and hence large scale retrenchment of workers was inevitably 
adopted. Immigrant labour from China and India that formed the bulk of the 
labour force in these two industries were drastically reduced. In 1929 the total 
number of Indian labourers in Malaya including the Straits Settlements was 
estimated at 336,334 and in 1932 it dropped to 177,927 a drop of 158,407 or 
47 percent. 2 Most of those who were unemployed were sent back to India. 
As for the Chinese, in 1929 it was estimated that there were 104,000 tin mine 
workers in the Federated Malay States and this figure dropped to 57,403 in 
December 1930. 3 It was also estimated that between 1930 and 1932 about 
50,494 of these unemployed mine coolies were sent back to China.1 Many of 
the unemployed Indian and Chinese immigrant workers were repatriated to 
their home countries at government expense. It was the government’s view that 
it would be cheaper to repatriate the redundant workers at government expense 
than having to look after them in Malaya. 
The native Malays were equally affected by the depression. Although 
many were rice farmers with some having rubber small holdings, they 
too lost their money income because of the fall in the price of rubber. The 
Malays, Chinese and Indians who worked in the government departments 
as subordinate officers were also retrenched due to austerity measures. 
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Economics aside, the depression also put a great strain on ethnic relations in 
the country. The unhampered flow of Chinese and Indian immigrant labour 
into Malaya that had been a cause for concern among the Malays for quite a 
while, began to show its ugly side during the depression years. Compounded 
by the economic strain then prevailing, the Malays felt that the immigrants 
were taking away what was rightfully theirs. This became evident when the 
Malays were also retrenched from the primary industries as well as from the 
government services. On the other hand the immigrant races, especially those 
born locally, felt that the colonial government policies were unfair to them and 
strongly favouring the Malays. They demanded that they too be given equal 
rights like the Malays. This naturally caused a great strain on ethnic relations. 
Although by 1933/1934 the economy had recovered and the worst was clearly 
over but for those European and Chinese investors, the Malay peasants, and 
the Chinese and Indian immigrant labourers engaged in the primary industries 
and in other businesses who were directly or indirectly affected by the crisis, it 
left lasting and permanent effects. This paper, however, confines its discussion 
to the Malays in the Federated Malay States, how they were affected and their 
reaction to the crisis. 
Literature Review
Despite the fact that the economic depression of the 1930s was an important 
event and had such a profound effect on the economy and the people in Malaya, 
it had not received the attention it rightly deserves by way of research from 
historians. Much of the existing literature on the depression in Malaya is in the 
form of articles in journals. There is no in depth study on this topic. However 
the pioneering work on the depression in Malaya was undertaken by Ong Chin 
Boo through his academic exercise, entitled “A Short Study of the Malayan 
Depression, 1929 – 1934”. 5He discussed the depression from the economic 
perspective which includes the fall in the price of primary products of rubber 
and tin in the world market, restriction schemes on rubber and tin and also 
restriction on entry of immigrant labour into Malaya as response to overcome 
the economic crisis. Khoo Kay Kim’s paper “The Great Depression: The 
Malaysian Context” 6 has also touched on several issues about the depression 
- like Malaya’s overdependence on the export economy, some effects of the 
depression on the labouring class and how the government and people faced 
the financial crisis. Though brief, it provides some early information about the 
economic depression in Malaya. Some writers have chosen to look at specific 
industries affected by the slump. For example, Azmi Khalid’s article, “The 
Social Organization of the Mining Industry during the Depression 1929 – 1933 
in Malaya7 focuses on the Chinese tin mine workers especially with regard to 
the problem of unemployment and repatriation of  Chinese workers in the tin 
mine industry. P.T. Bauer, in his article “Some Aspects of the Malayan Rubber 
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Slump 1929 – 1933” 8 has discussed the importance of the rubber industry 
to Malaya, how the fall in the price of rubber affected the wages of workers 
in the rubber industry, unemployment and repatriation of Indian immigrant 
workers. K. Nadaraja’s paper “Indian Immigrant Labour in Malaya during the 
Economic Crisis of the 1930s” 9 has discussed how the collapse of the rubber 
industry during the depression years affected the Indian immigrant labour in 
Malaya, repatriation of unemployed workers and some of the social problems 
faced by those Indians who remained in the country. 
Besides these articles that have discussed directly some aspects 
of the depression, a few writers while writing on the economic history of 
Malaya have also indirectly touched on the depression years. For example, 
J.H. Drabble10 and P.T. Bauer11 have both discussed in detail the growth of the 
rubber industry, the role of small holders and their contribution to the economy 
of the country and have in the process touched on some problems caused by 
the economic depression. Lim Teck Ghee, while writing on the agricultural 
economy of Malaya during the colonial period, has discussed in detail, 
development of rice, rubber, coconut cultivation, the rise and fall in the price of 
these commodities and how it affected the economic welfare of farmers. Lim 
has also explained how farmers were absorbed into the international economic 
system before the depression set-in and some of the problems encountered by 
these farmers during the economic crisis. Another writer, Loh Kok Wah has 
discussed the problems faced by Chinese tin mine coolies in Kinta, Perak and 
how they faced the depression years. A book by Lim Chong Yah has discussed 
the economic growth of Malaya between 1874 until 1963. The book is useful 
in understanding the economic development of Malaya but its discussion on 
the depression is very limited. As can be seen most of the existing literature 
on the depression years is limited in scope and only touches on certain aspects 
of the crisis. There has been no comprehensive study on how the depression 
affected the people and they responded to the situation. An attempt is made in 
this paper to understand some aspects of the Malay reaction to the economic 
crisis. 
Background
British colonization of the Malay States in the 19th century and their subsequent 
laissez-faire economic policy were directly responsible for the transformation 
of the country’s economy from one based on subsistence agriculture to 
export of primary goods. This was especially obvious after the 1870s, when 
the country saw a quantum leap in its economic activities with tin mining, 
commercial agriculture and from the beginning of the 20th century, rubber 
cultivation taking precedence over others as the core economic activities of 
the country. Tin and rubber emerged as the two most important items of export 
and hence the country’s main source of foreign currency earnings. By the 
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advent of the 20th century too, the economy of the Malay States had already 
been well-integrated with the international market forces. Hence to sustain the 
growing power of the export sector, especially that of rubber and tin, the need 
for a larger and cheaper labour force became imperative. As the native Malay 
population was not sufficiently large enough to meet the growing demand of 
the new industries the government had to look outside the country for its labour 
supply. This problem was compounded by the fact that Malay peasants who 
were so used to subsistence agriculture life style of cultivating rice, growing 
fruit trees and fishing were generally reluctant to work under rigid and harsh 
conditions posed by the new industries. Hence, to meet the growing demand 
for cheap labour, the colonial government brought in Chinese and Indians from 
their home countries to work in the tin mines and rubber plantations opened up 
by Europeans entrepreneurs. They were brought in through various incentive 
schemes. The Indian labour force to Malaya was mainly from the South India 
and from different social background. 
Malay peasant involvement in rubber cultivation began with the 
opening of large plantations by European companies where they worked on part 
time or on contract basis but seldom as permanent workers like the immigrants. 
However Malay peasant involvement in rubber cultivation began in earnest 
during the boom-years of 1909 and 1910 when they too began to be attracted 
by money, the new element that influenced every aspect of human life. They 
realized that land and services had value and capital was a necessary evil for 
development. They also realized that more profits could be obtained through 
rubber cultivation than through their traditional rice farming. Thousands of 
native Malays and immigrants from the Netherlands East Indies therefore 
went into rubber planting. As a result Malay peasant demand for land began to 
increase sharply. For example, in the state of Perak, for 1915, there were 9,478 
applications from Malays for small-holdings and the following year (1916) 
this figure almost doubled to 17,891.12 In Negeri Sembilan for the same period, 
the number of applications was 15,194 and 26,826.13  In the state of Selangor, 
the book for the registration of small holdings had to be closed because of too 
many applications.14 In the other Malay states too, the situation was reported 
to be the same. Generally, rubber land below 25 acres was considered a small 
holding.  However, the average acreage of the Malay small holding was very 
small, i.e. between 3 and 5 acres and run on a family basis. In the Malay 
settlements, rubber trees were grown around fruit and coconut trees. But at the 
height of the boom in order to make more profit from rubber, there were few 
reported cases of Malays having converted even padi land to grow rubber. 15 
By 1922, the total acreage of land under small holdings owned by all races in 
the Federated Malay States alone was 470,446 and by 1928 this had increased 
to 535,196 (37.3%) compared with rubber land classified as estates which 
amounted to 898,119 acres16or 62.7 percent.  This shows that small holders, 
including the Malays played a significant role in the development of the rubber 
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industry in Malaya. As such by the eve of the depression small holders too had 
been absorbed into the international economic system. So when the economy 
collapsed they too were affected badly.
The Collapse of the Tin and Rubber Industries
The economic crisis in Malaya too began with the crash in the Wall Street 
Stock Exchange in New York in October 1929 and reached its high point in 
1932. During this period the total value of all items of export trade from the 
Federated Malay States (FMS) fell from $349 million in 1929 to just $88 
million in 1932, a fall of 74.8 percent.17 The average price of tin fell from 
$104.37 per pikul in 1929 to $60.29 per pikul in 1931,18  a fall of 42.2%. This 
meant the total export value of tin fell from $117.5 million in 1929 to $31.3 
million in 193119, a fall of 73.4%.  The fall in the price of rubber was even more 
drast21 in 1932 i.e. a fall of 79.5 percent, while the fall in the total export value 
of all rubber for the same period was from $202 million to $37 million22 i.e. a 
fall of 81.7 percent. This drastic fall in the price of rubber, the most important 
item of export, crippled the rubber industry and seriously affected all those 
dependent on it for their livelihood, including the Malay small-holders. When 
it became apparent that it was not profitable to produce rubber anymore, many 
estates suspended tapping completely or partially. Some of the small holdings 
were left unattended or only partially tapped.
Fall in Government Revenue
The drastic fall in the total value of all exports of goods also had serious 
implications on government revenue. It caused great financial crisis to the 
government which had been for too long largely dependent on the export 
sector for nearly all its revenue. In 1932, the worst year of the depression, the 
total value of all exports in the country was just $87.85 million as compared 
with $349.01 million in 1929, a fall of $261.16 million or 74.8%. Government 
revenue from taxes collected fell from $81.80 million in 1929 to $43.82 million 
in 1932, a fall of 46.4%. This clearly affected the financial situation of the 
government which then resorted to various austerity measures to cut down its 
expenses. Consequently, government expenditure fell, from $84.66 million in 
1929 to  just $53.74 million in 1932. 23 The drastic fall in government revenue 
as well as its drastic cut in its expenses obviously had serious implications on 
the proper functioning of the government machinery and the people who were 
dependent on the government for their livelihood.
How the Malays were Affected by the Depression
All communities in the country  involving all categories of workers - the 
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European and Chinese entrepreneurs, businessmen, hawkers, estate labourers, 
mine workers, farmers, smallholders as well as government employees were 
affected by the depression in one way or another though by varying degrees. 
But the rubber and tin industries which had the largest work force in the country 
were the worst hit. Some of the redundant immigrant labourers from both the 
tin and rubber industries were deported to their home countries at government 
expense. Those who remained behind in their respective industries had to 
survive on reduced wages or irk out a living through vegetable gardening and 
by other means. 
Malays who were directly affected by the economic crisis were those 
who were engaged in the rubber estates and tin mines, small-holders, peasants 
and low-rung employees in the government services. Although the number 
of Malays engaged as paid workers in the rubber plantations and tin mines 
were comparatively smaller than the immigrant communities, still they were 
affected. For example, in 1931 there were only 7,373 Malays working on large 
rubber plantations in the FMS compared with 37,863 Chinese and 203,036 
Indians.24 The number of Malays engaged as labourers in the tin mines in 
the FMS for the same period was even lower. There were only 1,152 Malays 
(including Javanese) as compared with 6,261 Indians and 74, 571 Chinese. 
25Yet they too were displaced as a result of reduced wages or loss of job. 
A large section of the Malays displaced by the slump were small 
holders, farmers and those employed as subordinates in the colonial government 
services such as junior clerks, postmen and policemen. The fall in the price of 
rubber had affected the Malay small holders as they too were dependent on 
their rubber small holdings for some money income. There were reported cases 
of some small holdings left untapped as it was not profitable to tap anymore. 
But the acreage of small holdings that were untapped was small as compared 
with those tapped. For example, at the height of the depression in 1932, it was 
estimated that some 79,000 acres or 15.5% of all small holdings in the FMS 
were left untapped. 26 But most of those untapped small holdings were either 
owned by the Chettiars the Indian money-lenders or Chinese who engaged 
paid workers to perform the task. The Malay small holdings which were 
generally small 3 – 5 acres and operated by family members were however 
tapped, though on an irregular basis,  whenever there was a need for some 
money income to buy some essentials. Although it was difficult to estimate the 
actual fall in the income of Malay small holders but it was clear that they were 
getting far less than what they got before the depression. A rough idea of the 
fall in income of the Malay small holders could however be deduced from the 
returns per acre. For example, for 1929 the estimated annual return for a small 
holding of one acre was 142 straits dollars but for 1932 it was just 19 straits 
dollars.27 Moreover, the income of Malay small holders was further reduced 
because of exploitation by rubber dealers who often claimed that the rubber 
produced by them was of inferior quality.
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Retrenchment in the Government Services
The Malays were also affected by the retrenchment exercise in the government 
services. The fall in the price of the primary products in the world market 
affected government revenue which in turn affected the maintenance  of 
the government administration. At the height of the depression, one of the 
actions taken by the FMS government to reduce administrative costs was 
the establishment of the Retrenchment Commission in March 1932 on the 
orders of the High Commissioner of FMS, Cecil Clementi. Among others, the 
Retrenchment Commission had suggested a 1/3 reduction in the number of 
employees in the government services and a 40% cut to administrative cost 
of each department. 28 This was because a large portion of the government 
expenditure went towards paying salaries of employees. However, retrenchment 
in the government services could only be effected through a complete 
restructuring of various government departments at all levels federal, state and 
district. This involved abolition of redundant posts, amalgamation of certain 
posts, transfer of staff to other departments, reduction in salary scales and other 
benefits hitherto enjoyed by employees and as a last resort retrenchment of 
government servants.
Although it was the government policy that in effecting the 
retrenchment exercise, the Malays should be the last to be retrenched, such 
directives could not be strictly adhered because the economic situation was so 
bad that even Malay government servants had to be laid-off. For example, in 
the FMS at the end of 1932, a total of 98 Malays from the District and Land 
Offices alone were retrenched. These included clerks, penghulus and office 
boys.29Despite government efforts to retain as many educated Malays, and 
Malays with experience in the government services, they were still retrenched. 
Between July 1930 and February 1933, the total number of Malays retrenched 
from government services in the FMS was 541. 30 This figure does not include 
Malays who had resigned voluntarily. However, this figure only represented 
1/10 of the total number of all employees retrenched from government services 
during the depression years. The large number of those retrenched from the 
various government services were Chinese, Indians and some Europeans. 
Indebtedness among Malay small holders
Another way the Malays were affected by the economic depression, though 
indirectly, was through indebtedness. As a result of the fall in the income 
of farmers/small holders and retrenchment in the government services, 
indebtedness among Malays became a serious problem during the depression 
years. The lack of any savings, made worse by the fall in the price of rubber 
and loss of job, left many Malays,  especially those in the low income category, 
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in perpetual poverty. As a result many were forced to borrow money from 
various financial sources - Chinese shopkeepers, middle men, rubber dealers, 
chettiars and others for their daily expenses or to finance wedding feasts and 
festivals. This left many in indefinite indebtedness. According to Badriyah 
Haji Salleh, in the district of Batang Padang in Perak,
“The period of depression and restriction was generally a period of 
hardships among Malay smallholders. Accounts of their hardships 
often appeared in newspapers, reporting, inter alia, that some had to 
eat rice boiled with tapioca, or could have only one meal a day. Others 
were unable to pay their land rents and had to lose the land, and many 
became heavily indebted.”31
The chettiar  money-lender was an important source of money for Malay 
farmers and smallholders because loans from them could be obtained easily 
and quickly without much hazzle. However borrowing of money from the 
chettiars required some form of security like land grant. Some farmers had 
even used the Malay reserve land grant for this purpose. The government was 
obviously concerned with the high level of indebtedness among the Malays, 
especially the small holders and farmers who used land grant as security for 
loans. Although there were conditions attached to the enactment on Malay 
Reserve Land that forbid the transfer of such land to non-Malays or to be 
used as security for securing loans, yet this practice was rampant. There were 
numerous cases where Malay Reserve Land was transferred to non-Malays 
because of some weaknesses in the enactment. In 1934, in the Federated Malay 
States alone, Malays living on Malay Reservation Land, had borrowed money 
amounting to almost $4 million from various parties.32 In Perak alone a total of 
2,094 acres of Malay Reserve Land had been transferred to non-Malays with 
the sum borrowed amounting to almost $2 million33 There were several cases 
where small holders/farmers failure to settle loans had resulted in foreclosure 
of their land by chettiars or the land being auctioned.34
mall holders were also indebted to the government Land Office for 
failing to pay land rent. For example, in the district of Selangor, for the month 
of March 1931 alone, 103 farmers were given notice of sale of land, for failing 
to settle arears in land rent. Of this, 9 were Chinese small holders the rest 
were Malays. 35 In the same district, for 1932, the number of people who got 
similar notice was more than 1,000. 36 Although the government was concerned 
about the seriousness of the problem, especially among the Malays, it could 
do nothing to stop them from borrowing. At the same time it was also difficult 
to determine the total sum of money borrowed by small holders because 
the sources available for loans were numerous. However it is estimated that 
amount of money borrowed by Malay small holders alone in the Federated 
Malay States was around $25 million.37 
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How the Malays faced the situation
The Malay farmers affected by the depression had to face the situation in the 
best possible way they could. While many Chinese and Indians labourers who 
lost their jobs were forced to return to their home land or seek employment 
elsewhere, the Malays farmers had the benefit of remaining on their land in their 
villages. They could depend on the rice they cultivated and fish they caught 
from the numerous streams for their daily meals. They also kept themselves 
occupied by mending their fruit trees in their dusun. So for the unemployed 
Malays who had some land, they were at least assured of their daily food. What 
they lacked was money to buy other essentials. But for the majority of Malays 
who had no land, nor had the ability to overcome the hardship caused by the 
economic slump, they were on the verge of poverty and were even worse off 
than the immigrant communities. Malays who lived in towns were mostly 
government employees and a few petty traders. As a result of the economic 
crisis, some of these unemployed urban Malays returned to their villages to irk 
out a living on their ancestral land. But those who had no land had no choice 
but to remain in towns and find alternative work like growing vegetables on 
vacant government land or do odd jobs.  
Government Efforts to help the Malays
Meanwhile the government also took various measures to help all displaced 
government employees of all communities. However, as for the Malays, 
in effecting the retrenchment exercise, the government clearly took into 
consideration the position of the Malays as natives of the country. They wanted 
to ensure that as many Malays as possible were retained in their job. There were 
numerous circulars both from the FMS government and the State governments 
with regard to this. Heads of departments were reminded that preference in 
employment should always be given to native Malays first and locally born 
Asians second. 38 For example a circular addressed to Heads of Departments 
from the Acting Secretary of State FMS, stated that:
“Heads of Departments and Officers are informed that selection for 
retrenchment, as always for recruitment is subject to the ordinary 
government policy of giving preference in employment to Malays first, 
and to the other locally born Asiatic second.” 39
Similarly, a circular from the Perak government dated 15 January 1931 stated 
that:  
“Heads of Departments are informed that it must be clearly understood 
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that, where reduction of staff is necessary, the natives of the country are 
to be the last of those retrenched unless there are reasons adduced to 
the Resident to the contrary.” 40
But despite such circulars to retain as many Malays as possible in the 
government services, still it became unavoidable that Malay employees had to 
be retrenched. But various measures were taken by the government to help the 
unemployed Malays. For example, in Selangor, a new Malay settlement was 
opened at Sungai Buluh to help Malay smallholders and other unemployed 
Malays in agricultural activities and handy craft work. With help from the 
agricultural and cooperative departments, Malays were encouraged to grow 
vegetables.41 Their products were sold at various Malay settlements around 
Kuala Lumpur such as at Kampung Melayu on every Sunday. Some became 
very successful vegetable gardeners in the process.
One positive effect of the depression was the concerted effort by 
the government to increase the production of rice in the FMS. Although the 
country produced rice and there was plenty of land to cultivate more but for 
a long time the country had been dependent on neighbouring countries for 
her rice supply. Two thirds of the Malaya’s rice needs were imported from 
Thailand, Burma and Indochina. But owing to the fall in government revenue 
caused by the fall in the price of her export commodities the government’s 
power to import goods was drastically reduced. The import of goods fell 
from $201.39 million in 1929 to $67.13 million in 193342 a fall of $134.26 
or 66.6 percent. The government realized its implications and took action to 
increase the production of food crops, especially rice. Towards this end, in 
1930 the newly appointed High Commissioner to the FMS, Cecil Clementi, 
appointed a Rice Cultivation Committee  under the Director of Agriculture, 
H.A. Tempany. The Committee was tasked the responsibility to encourage 
the further cultivation of rice in Malaya. Malay farmers were given various 
incentives to grow rice. In 1930 some Malays and Javanese had opened a 
2,000 acre land for rice cultivation in Selangor.43  This certainly contributed 
to the increase in rice production.  In the FMS, for rice cultivation season of 
1929-1930, the total acreage of land under rice was 174,466 acre and for the 
1931-1932 season it had increased to 194,580 acres, an increase in 20,114 
acres. 44 This resulted in an overall increase in the production of rice for the 
same period, i.e from 48, 727 ton (1929-1930) to 66,517 ton (1931-1932) an 
increase of 17, 790 ton.45To boost rice cultivation the Drainage and Irrigation 
Department was established in 1932. Furthermore in 1932, the government 
opened two large rice cultivation schemes, one at Pancang Bedina in Kuala 
Selangor (7,000 acres) and another at Sungai Manik in Perak.46 Through these 
schemes the government was not only able to increase the total amount of rice 
produced locally but also gradually reduce importation. But most importantly 
it was able to provide those Malays displaced by the slump, opportunities to 
Article: K. Nadaraja
 
Jebat  Volume 43 (1) (July 2016) Page | 56
work as rice farmers, if not permanently at least on a temporary basis  until the 
economy improves.
 Meanwhile it can be said that the depression also had its positive 
effects on the Malays. One obvious sign was a change in their attitude towards 
certain jobs. For example, before the depression Malays often shunned doing 
menial jobs. However the difficult times had forced them to accept any 
job, including road construction and drainage work to carry on their lives. 
Commenting on this The Straits Times wrote:
One unmistakable sign of distress is that the Malays, who have hitherto 
scorned to do anything in the nature of coolie work are now beginning to 
offer themselves for work on road improvements. 47
Malay Reaction to the Immigrant Communities
One of the effects of the economic depression in Malaya could also be seen 
in ethnic relations. Good relations that had long existed among the various 
races in the country turned strained during this period. Several race related 
issues that had been simmering since the 1920s culminated into strained 
relations between the native Malays and the immigrant communities during 
the depression years. The issues that threatened the Malays were the influx of 
immigrants into Malaya, the demand for equal rights by domiciled immigrants 
and certain pro-Malay policies of the colonial government which the immigrant 
communities started to question.
The strong Malay resentment against the unchecked entry of Chinese 
and Indian immigrant labour into Malaya that has been going on since the 
late 19th century began to culminate during the depression years of 1930s. By 
the third decade of the 20th century, the demography of Malaya had changed 
dramatically with the immigrant races becoming majority and the natives 
being reduced to a minority race in some states. For example, in 1931 the total 
population of the FMS was 1,713,096, of which 711,540 persons or 41.5% 
were Chinese, 593,731 (34.7%) Malays and 379,996 (22.2%) were Indians.48 
It was obvious that the number of Chinese in the FMS had exceeded the number 
of Malays, while the immigrant races together formed 1,091,536 persons or 
63.7% of the total population of the FMS while the Malay population was 
slightly over one-third. 49 In Selangor alone the Chinese population was double 
that of the Malays while the Indians had also exceeded the number of Malays 
in the state. The Chinese population was 241,351, Indians 155,924 and Malays 
122,868.50 In Perak and Negeri Sembilan, there were more Chinese than 
Malays. As a result of the unabated flow of immigrants towns that emerged 
in areas of economic activity were often crowded with immigrants. In Kuala 
Lumpur in 1931, there were 126,536 Chinese, 43,865 Indians and 21,413 
Malays. In Kinta in the same period there were 170,339 Chinese, 41,462 
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Indians and 34,439 Malays. 51
The free flow of immigrant labour had caused great anxiety and 
uncertainty among the Malays. There was growing evidence of Malay 
restiveness and pressure from the Malay leaders at the overwhelming presence 
of Chinese and Indians in their land. The psychological impact of this on the 
ordinary Malays was equally serious. There was fear of them being dispossessed 
of their land, becoming a minority race and marginalized in their own country. 
According to Emerson, from the early 1920s the Malay rulers in the FMS had 
not only lost their political and economic power but “the Federated Malay 
States have largely lost their Malay character and had taken on a markedly 
Chinese, Indian and British complexion. 52
But what was of greater concern to the Malay elite was the inherent 
fear that the Malays were losing their land to foreigners. Most of the prime 
land in the Malay States under commercial cultivation and mines were owned 
by Europeans and the wealthy immigrant races. In 1933, for example, of the 
2,301 rubber estates over 100 acres in Malaya, only 59 were owned by Malays, 
and all but two of these were below 1,000 acres.53 The ordinary Malays were 
left with just the rice land and small orchards which were mostly placed under 
Malay Reserve. The Malay elites felt that if there was no control over the 
acquisition of land by non-Malays, the Malays would one day become, what 
Raja Chulan said “landless men in their own land. 54 The Malays were also 
unhappy when the immigrant races started to demand for equal rights like 
those enjoyed by Malays. The economic crisis and Malay political sentiments 
prevailing then in the country had caused great uncertainty and concern 
particularly among the domiciled immigrant races, especially among the 
local born, as to their future in Malaya. They began to assert and demanded 
equal rights like those enjoyed by the Malays, especially in relation to land 
for the cultivation of rice and job opportunities in the government services.55 
The pro-Malay policy adopted by the colonial government in the 1920s to 
uplift the status of the natives and questioned by the immigrant communities 
angered the Malays. It had long been the policy of the government of the FMS 
to provide the native Malays with more jobs in the subordinate ranks of the 
government services as this was a Malay land. But in the late 19th century 
and early years of the 20th century, as there were very few suitable Malays 
candidates for the posts of clerks, technicians, medical assistants etc., these 
vacancies were largely filled up by non-Malay immigrants with preference 
given to those born locally. And by 1920, Indians and Chinese together, both 
immigrants and local born, comprised the majority of the subordinate clerical 
and technical workers in all departments of the government.56 The Railway 
Department was one department that was dominated by Jaffna Tamils. In 1929, 
out of 2,072 clerks, there were only 95 Malays, most of them in category 3 
and below.57  In 1930, in the same department, out a total of 12,975 staff and 
workers, there were only 1,269 Malays.58  The situation was quite similar in 
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the other departments like the Public Works, Postal and Medical. As a result 
there was some degree of “alienation” of the public services. Such disparity 
obviously caused resentment among the Malays as they felt marginalized even 
in government jobs. So when a “pro-Malay” preferential policy was adopted 
the immigrant decried the move as being unfair. The Malay rulers and Malay 
elite were unhappy with the state of affairs of the Malays in the government 
departments. At both the State Council and Federal Council Meetings, rulers 
showed their displeasure with strong words. At the Rulers Meeting at Pekan on 
28th April 1932, the Sultan of Selangor criticized the government when he said:
“We all know that it has been the declared policy of the government 
to encourage the Malays to take a greater share in the administration 
of their country, but it seems to me that so far the policy has not met 
with entire success, because after 57 years of British protection we 
find that in practically all branches of the service, Malays are still 
very much in the minority.” 59
Similar sentiments were expressed in the Malay newspapers such as Saudara, 
Majlis, Lembaga Melayu and Al-Ikhwan against the overwhelming presence 
of the immigrant races. For example, Za’aba in his newspaper Al-Ikhwan, 
dated 16 December 1926 wrote:
“At present only in name this is a Malay country. The Malays are 
outnumbered by the Chinese who swarm in by the thousands every 
year and monopolize all the jobs, wealth and businesses of this 
country.” 60
As Malaya was a Malay land, these papers urged the Malays to be united in 
their stand to oppose the many demands being made by the immigrant races, 
especially the Chinese whose action appeared to undermine the position of 
the Malays as natives of the country.61 Saudara and Majlis, through their 
news reports began to have great impact on Malay sentiments. Clearly these 
papers were responsible for raising feelings of nationalism among the Malays. 
Slogans like “Tanah Melayu untuk orang Melayu” voiced by Malay leaders 
and highlighted in these newspapers went a long way in arousing feelings of 
nationalism among Malays. This also contributed to the strained relationship 
between the native Malays and the immigrant races. 
Conclusion
The paper has discussed how the Economic Depression of the 1930s affected 
the economy and the people of Malaya, especially the Malays in the Federated 
Malay States. The Malays who were affected were rubber small-holders 
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who lost their money income and those in the lower rung of the government 
services who lost their jobs. They had to manage their lives in the best way 
they could by growing food crops to sustain themselves. But what was of 
great concern was it plunged many Malays into indebtedness to the extent 
that many lost their land due to foreclosure. The overwhelming presence of 
Chinese and Indian immigrant labour in Malaya was another factor that was of 
great concern to the Malays worsened by their demand for equal rights like the 
Malays. This contributed to strained race-relations. But most importantly, the 
economic crisis also served to arouse Malay sentiments to defend their rights 
as natives of the country. 
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